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Collective Bargaining In The Federal
Public Service of Canada - After
Four Years - A Time To Reflect,
Review and Reform
By C. GORDON SIMMONS*
One of the most pressing problems on the American labor
scene is collective bargaining between the government, as
employer, and public service employees. Professor Simmons
in this article examines the unique approach that Canada has
taken in this area and the resulting experiences and problems
encountered by that system.
After four years of collective bargaining under the Federal
Public Service Act of Canada the participants are clamoring for
significant reforms which they claim must be implemented if
the process is to retain the high degree of acceptance it was
initially granted. Critics of late have been stating that too many
restrictions are built into the process which is rapidly robbing
it of any hope it may have in providing a viable mechanism to
cope with the increasing complexities associated with employer-
employee relations.
The enactment of the Public Service Staff Relations Act in
1967 extended collective bargaining to approximately 210,000
employees in the Federal Public Service Act of Canada. The fea-
tures of the Act resemble in many respects collective bargaining
in the private sector. It also contains several unique features of
its own. For a nation whose labor laws have largely followed
patterns established by others, it is somewhat surprising that the
measures which were adopted are not only unique in approach
but quite liberal in application. The Act applies to all employees
* Associate Professor of Law at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario
Canada. B.A., Acadia University;-B.C.L., University of New Brunswick; LL.M.,
University of Michigan School of Law.
I The Public Service Staff Relations Act, CAN. REv. STAT. Vol. VI C.P. 35(1970), [hereinafter the Act].
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in the Public Service of Canada, either in the central administra-
tion or in one of the several agencies that have retained their
autonomy and who are referred to in the Act as "separate em-
ployers."2 While the Treasury Board represents the employer
(Parliament) in the central administration, separate employers
retain their own labor relations experts. One of the unique
features included the establishment of a completely new and
independent administrative tribunal to administer the Act. While
the Minister of Labor is the person normally responsible for
ensuring that labor relations laws are enforced, it was recognized
very early in preparing for collective bargaining in the public
service that it would be most difficult for the Minister to provide
the degree of independence and impartiality required in a system
in which the government was one of the parties involved.3
Unlike the private sector where the government participates as
the impartial third party, with the Minister of Labor being the
catalyst, the establishment of the Public Service Staff Relations
Board (hereinafter called the Board) was the method selected to
carry out this role.
The Board is assisted in its task by an arbitration tribunal4
which deals with interest disputes5 by conciliators6 who assist
parties to reach settlements when they become deadlocked in
their negotiations; and by adjudicators7 who deal with grievances
involving rights disputes that are referred to adjudication. The
2 They include the Atomic Energy Control Board; The Centennial Commis-
sion; The Defence Research Board; The Economic Council of Canada; The
Medical Research Council; The National Film Board; The National
Research Council of Canada; The Northern Canada Power Commission;
The Public Service Staff Relations Board and the Science Council of
Canada. See § 4 of the Act
There are also 'Crown Corporations' which engage "Public em-
ployees" but they are excluded from the provisions of the Act. Crown
Corporations are similar in structure to privately owned corporations but
the share capital is wholly owned by the Government. Air Canada, The
Canadian National Railway and The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
are examples of such corporations and their labor-management relations
are regulated by the same laws which are applicable in the private sector.
See The Canada Labour Code, CAN. REv. STAT. C. L-1 § 4(d) (1970).
3 Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service, Queen's Printer, Ottawa at 25-6 (1965).
4 The Act § 60.
G The Act §§ 63-76. For a discussion of the distinction between contract or
interest arbitration and dispute arbitration see Goldman A Proposed Arbitration
Act for Kentucky, 22 Ann. J. 193, 197. See also note, TAe Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes Over Contract Terms, 58 Nw. U. L. BEv. 556, 558 (1964).
6 The Act H8 52, 78.
7 The Act § 92, 93.
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chairman of the arbitration tribunal is appointed by cabinet for a
term of seven years upon the recommendation of the Board.
Because of the heavy work load being experienced by the tribunal
two alternate chairmen were recently appointed8 on a part-time
basis." The tribunal is tripartite and the Board appoints its mem-
bers on an ad hoc basis, but the selection is restricted to an
available panel consisting of an equal number of employer-
employee representatives. Conciliation services available to the
parties are designed to assist them in reaching a collective agree-
ment. There may be a single conciliator or a three man concilia-
tion board and the chairman of the Board is empowered under
the Act to make such appointments. There are no full-time con-
ciliators as such, rather, persons experienced in labor-management
relations are called upon when either party seeks the assistance
of such services and the chairman of the Board determines that
conciliation is necessary. The chief adjudicator is on permanent
staff and is located at the Board's premises in Ottawa. He assigns
grievances to the various part-time adjudicators as well as ad-
judicating many grievances himself. The part-time adjudicators
are experienced arbitrators who adjudicate purely on an ad hoc
basis.
With the passage of collective bargaining legislation in 1967
a pioneering atmosphere permeated throughout the public service.
There was an awareness that many of the provisions in the new
legislation were unique to the public service in Canada and else-
where. No other nation had been so liberal in its approach to
such a problem and students of labor-management relations
awaited developments with keen anticipation and expectation.
It is surprising that Bill C-170'10 became law with very little
criticism, either destructive or constructive. Plaudits did come
from the labor organizations while on the other hand opponents
envisaged a complete cessation of public services with resulting
chaos. Such pessimism has not proved to be warranted but
neither has the legislation proved to be the panacea that some of
its proponents and authors believed it would be.
8 His Honor Judge Walter A. Little, a county court judge in the Province of
Ontario and Dr. A. W. R. Carrothers, President of the University of Alberta. Both
appointees are experienced labor arbitrators.
9 The Act § 60(5).
10 Bill C-170 received its first reading in the House of Commons on April 25,
1966 and its third reading February 20, 1967.
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During the early stages of development the legislation proved
to be equal to all that had been expected of it. It provided the
necessary machinery to accommodate the immediate needs of
the parties. The Board quickly assumed control under the experi-
enced chairmanship of Mr. Jacob Finkelman Q.C. n Bargaining
units were established, bargaining agents were certified and
initial collective agreements were entered into with seemingly
little effort. This orderly transition to the collective bargaining
process is attributable to several factors. Both parties were
aware they were on stage being watched by many interested
observers. And, since the employer had been the creator of the
process it was anxious to have it implemented without difficulties
and as speedily as possible. The bargaining agents were still
insecure in their new role and possessed an understandable de-
sire to cement their position by concluding collective agreements
as quickly as possible. Thus, both sides had a compelling urge to
sign collective agreements.
Another factor that contributed to the orderly transition to
collective bargaining is the nature of the civil servant, whose
history has not displayed the same degree of militancy normally
found in employees outside the public service. That is not to say
the civil servant was oblivious to what was happening around
him, nor can it be said he was totally complacent, but bargaining
agents did not experience a great deal of pressure to secure con-
cessions that could have caused difficulty in concluding those
initial agreements. The attitude of the civil servant is further
exemplified in the fact that 160,000 of the 198,000 employees
who are represented by bargaining agents have opted for binding
arbitration. 2 Of the 88,000 who have chosen the "strike" process,
approximately 25,000 are postal employees. 3 The 160,000 em-
ployees who have opted for binding arbitration are contained in
11 Q.C. means Queen's Counsel. In Canada the Bar is divided into junior and
senior members. To become a Q.C., a member of the Bar would normally have
been in practice a minimum of ten years and there is no assurance that he will be
appointed a Q.C. even at this time. The appointment is honorific which, while
being prestigious, affords certain privileges such as being called to the Inner Bar.
Mr. Finkelman had been Chairman of the Labor Relations Board for Ontario for
many years before joining the Public Service Staff Relations Board.
12 The Third Annual Report of The Public Service Staff Relations Board (the
Board) (1969-70), Information Canada, Ottawa, at 22.
13 The first annual report of the Board 1967-68, Information Canada, Ottawa,
at 36.
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100 of the 114 bargaining units. 4 This attitude is changing.
There has especially been a growing disenchantment with the
restrictive provisions contained in the legislation. Most of the
restrictions emerged when the collective bargaining process be-
came familiar to the participants. Nevertheless, the employee
organizations were aware that the Bill contained undesirable
provisions but they were not insistent upon their removal before
the Bill became law. This is understandable because the passage
of the Bill remained in the future and opponents 1 to the entire
scheme were a constant reminder of how fragile and insecure was
their position. Thus, while there existed some undesirable pro-
visions, the old cliche, a half a loaf is better than none, has some
relevancy. The situation is now changed. The few years of experi-
ence has generated a feeling of confidence in the employee
organizations and the shortcomings in the legislation have be-
come more apparent. Added to this have been the rather con-
servative interpretations of various sections of the statute which,
when taken altogether, have caused demands for change which
are becoming increasingly stronger. Thus, while excitement
and anticipation prevailed during the early stages in the develop-
ment of collective bargaining in the public service, such no
longer prevails. Indeed, because of the various criticisms which
persist a committee has been established to review the experience
of the entire process during its first four years.16 Interested bodies
appearing before the committee have voiced their criticisms and
have called for change.
While some aspects of the Act have caused concern and have
been the subject of widespread criticism it must be remembered
that many features of the Act have proved to work very satis-
factorily and there will not likely be any changes made so far
as they are concerned. Reform is needed in those provisions
which are not apparently performing the functions for which
they were designed. We shall look at some such provisions.
'4 Report, supra note 12, at 22.
15 See, for example the debates carried on in the House of Commons, The
House of Commons Debates, February 17, 1967, Volume III, No. 210, Queen's
Printer, Ottawa 1967, at 13158-196.
16 Advisory Committee to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration on the
Public Service Staff Relations Act, (1971), John G. Bryden, chairman.
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I. CERTIFICATIONS
A bargaining agent, once certified under the Act, enjoys
exclusive rights to represent ali the employees within the bar-
gaining unit that is deemed by the Board to be appropriate.
Unlike similar legislation in the private sector there is no pro-
vision under the Act for voluntary recognition by the employer.'7
It is not difficult to understand the absence of a voluntary recog-
nition provision where the employer is the government. For the
government to voluntarily recognize a bargaining agent in such
circumstances could open the way for accusations of favoritism
which it could ill afford.
Because of the requirement contained in the legislation that
initial certifications encompass bargaining units on an occupa-
tional group basis,"8 there is a potential problem that has not
yet surfaced but one with which the Board will eventually have
to deal. The root of the problem began prior to the introduction
of collective bargaining. A great number of positions, classifica-
tions and job grades had existed in the public service. 9 The
Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service expressed the opinion that the organization of the public
service would have to undergo comprehensive reorganization for
an orderly system of collective bargaining to exist and recom-
mended that it be reorganized into six broad categories encom-
passing sixty-seven different occupational groups. 20 The recom-
mendation was accepted.2' The committee also recommended
that bargaining units in the central administration be established
on an occupational group basis during the initial certification
period.22 This recommendation was likewise adopted into the
legislation. 3 Thus, during the initial certification period the Board
17 However, the bargaining agent may be replaced by having his certification
revoked by a rival union by loss of support of its members, fraud or by abandon-
ment. See The Public Service Act §§ 41-3 (1970).
I8 The Act § 26(4).
19 Preparatory Committee, supra note 3, at 9. Where it was stated "At the
present time, there are over 138,000 continuing positions under the Civil Service
Act. They are found in about 700 classes and 1,700 grades. Some of the classes
cover only one occupation, others encompass several related occupations; still
others cover a number of unrelated occupations.
20 Id. at 10-14.
21The Act § 26(1).22 Preparatory Committee, supra note 3, at 31.23 The Act § 26(4).
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was authorized to certify bargaining units comprising: (1) all
employees in an occupational group, (2) all supervisory em-
ployees in an occupational group, or (3) all non-supervisory em-
ployees in an occupational group. Such an approach to collective
bargaining had both immediate and future ramifications. The
most immediate of such proposals were felt by the civil service
associations. Largely because of the above recommended changes
in the organization of the public service some of the then existing
civil service associations merged to form the Public Service
Alliance of Canada in 1966.24
The Board had a certain amount of discretion in determining
the appropriateness of bargaining units during initial certifications
when objections to the proposed bargaining unit were filed.25
However, with but one exception, the Ships Pilots Case,26 the
Board refused to make any exceptions. In that case the Board
was persuaded to grant certification on other than an occupational
group basis when it was satisfied that the interests of the em-
ployees were so diverse that no gainful purpose would be served
by insisting that all belong to one bargaining unit. The employees
involved were ships' pilots. They included one group of harbour
pilots working out of Sydney, Nova Scotia and Goose Bay,
Labrador on the East Coast and the second group who worked
out of the Port Weller-Sarnia Great Lake area. The employment
season for each group of pilots varied as well as the work which
they performed. The terms and conditions of work and the basis
for remuneration were likewise different and the Board could see
no reason for them to be included in one bargaining unit.
While the Board deviated from its normal pattern when
certifying ships' pilots, its decision in the second Ship Repair
Case27 is an example of the tenacity with which the Board refused
to grant other applications for splintering units. This application
involved a request to include all non-supervisory employees in a
bargaining unit with only a portion of the supervisors. In denying
24 The Associations realized that because each had members in all or most all
of the prop~osed occupational groups (hence bargaining units), a struggle would
ensue over bargaining rights if they were to remain separate associations.25 The Act § 26 5).
26The Ships Pilots case, Board File 148-2-128, October 6, 1969. Note:
Information Canada, Ottawa has recently undertaken issuing Board reports but
has not become current to date. The reports are available from the Board.
27 Board File 146-2-9; 146-2-17, January 11, 1968.
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the application the Board stated that while it could separate a
supervisory from non-supervisory bargaining unit, it could not,
under the subsection, separate all non-supervisory and some, but
not all, of the supervisory employees.
By March 81, 1970, the end of the initial round of bargaining
had occurred and with it the initial certification period had
terminated. Of the total certifications representing 114 bargaining
units, there were 108 collective agreements that had been entered
into, each representing one bargaining unit. Seventy-three col-
lective agreements had been entered into during the fiscal year
April 1, 1969 to March 81, 1970 with thirty-five being concluded
the previous fiscal year.28 Now that the initial certification period
has passed the Board is no longer restricted in determining
appropriate bargaining units.2 9 Just how long a period remains
before the Board will be called upon to enunciate a policy on
future certification applications for regional or more local bar-
gaining units is uncertain but such applications will undoubtedly
be made. As noted above, it was considered expedient to have
all employees of each occupational group in one bargaining unit.
This clearly assisted the orderly transition to collective bargaining.
No serious objections were made at that time by employee
organizations because they had members throughout the public
service. But such a policy, if continued, will pre-empt any new
organization from gaining certification and conversely will lock
in isolated groups of employees who might otherwise believe that
their interests could best be served by a more local bargaining
agent. To cite an example, there are the air traffic controllers
who are employed in fairly localized areas. Such areas include St.
John's, Newfoundland, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, Win-
nipeg, Vancouver, etc. Are the interests of employees working in
St. John's sufficiently similar to those working in Vancouver to
insist upon them remaining in the same bargaining unit? I do not
think so. It is my belief that there will be eventually a number of
applications requesting the Board to carve out new bargaining
units from those presently existing. It is the function of the Board
to determine appropriate bargaining units, but it will no doubt
require strong arguments to convince the Board that the present
28 Third Annual Report, supra note 12, at 46.
29 The Act § 32.
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approach is detrimental to overall collective bargaining before
granting such applications.
II. EMPLOYEE DESIGNATIONS
One of the unique features of this legislation is the option that
is granted to employees to select either binding arbitration or the
right to strike. If employees select the strike procedure certain
safeguards are built into the system whereby the services to the
public may not be totally curtailed if there are employees in the
bargaining unit whose duties are necessary to protect "the safety
or security of the public."2 0 The procedure is as follows: within
twenty days after notice to bargain collectively is given by either
party, the employer is to provide a list of employees or classes of
employees whom it considers to be designated employees under
Section 79 of the Act."' The bargaining agent has fifteen days to
file an objection 2 and if agreement cannot be reached between
the parties, the Board makes the decision. 3
On March 31, 1970, the latest date on which figures are avail-
able, there were 160,191 employees included in bargaining units
known to the employer and twenty days had passed since notice
to bargain collectively had been given. Of this total 21,866
employees or 13.6% had been designated under Section 79.34
What these figures do not tell however is the fact that some
bargaining units have 100% of their members designated35 which
effectively compels the bargaining agent to choose binding
arbitration. There may also be situations where a high per-
centage of the employees in the bargaining unit has been desig-
nated and, while not necessarily being 100% of the total number
of employees in the unit, any strike by those not designated would
be considered a fruitless exercise.
While not mandatory, it is fairly important that a bargaining
agent seek a preliminary list of designations before selecting
which method of dispute settlement process it intends to follow.
So The Act § 79 (1).
31 The Act § 79(2).
32 P.S.S.R.B. Regulations and Rules of Procedure, § 29A.
33 The Act § 79(3)-(4).
84 Third Annual Report, supra note 12, at 22.
35 Brief presented by the Public Service Alliance of Canada to the Advisory
Committee to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, April 1971, vol. 1 of 2,
at 92. The groups included correctional, fire-fighters and lightkeepers.
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On at least one occasion the bargaining agent selected the right to
"strike" without first having obtained such a list and subsequently
found that all employees in the unit were designated. By agree-
ment between the parties it was decided that if negotiations
required a conciliation board, each would nominate a member
of the appropriate panel of the Public Service Arbitration Tri-
bunal and that the nominees would agree to have the chairman
of the Tribunal act as chairman of the conciliation board and the
award would be final and binding.36
One of the major sources of complaint in designating em-
ployees is the interpretation placed upon the phrase "safety or
security of the public". While it has been interpreted very
broadly so as to include 100% of the employees in some bargaining
units, there have been other units such as postal operations which
have had no designations. In the Electronics Case37 the Board
attempted to establish broad guidelines concerning the problem
associated with designating employees. The issue involved elec-
tronic technicians whose duties involved the maintenance of
electronic equipment on coast guard vessels, weather ships, search
and rescue vessels, and ice breakers. The Board established five
basic principles:
1. Inconvenience only to the public in case of a shut down of
services was not sufficient. To be designated, an employee
would have to be performing services necessary to the
safety or security of the public.
2. In the absence of actual experience the Board adopted the
view that a conservative approach was justifiable where
there was a probability, or even a possibility, that the safety
or security of the public would be jeopardized. In such a
case § 79 became operative.
3. The Board lacked authority to order the employer to in-
struct the employees in other bargaining units or non-
organized employees to make limited use of the equipment
serviced by the technicians.
4. The Board emphasized that its conclusions were not to be
taken as setting out definitive statements for all time.
5. The Board determined that certain employees be desig-
36 The Second Annual Report of the Public Service Staff Relations Board
(1968-69), Information Canada, Ottawa at 28.3 Board File 181-2-8, September 5, 1969.
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nated on a stand-by basis, which meant to be readily avail-
able for work on short notice to replace a designated em-
ployee who could not perform his work because of some
illness.
In reaching its decision the Board acknowledged that it did
not possess the research facilities to explore the issues in depth
and concluded that if it was to err it should do so on the con-
servative side. One Board member, Mr. A. Andras, considered
the approach of the Board to be so conservative that he wrote a
stinging minority opinion wherein he criticized the Board for
enunciating a policy which effectively resulted in a "business as
usual" approach to the problem. The bargaining agents claim
that employee designations are applied much too broadly which
effectively eliminates any choice in selecting the method of dis-
pute settlement in many situations leaving only binding arbitration
available. Once binding arbitration becomes the only alternative
the restrictions on negotiable items become greater because the
arbitration tribunal is severely limited in the number of bargain-
able issues with which it may deal; and this in turn leads to
additional grounds for complaint.
III. RESTRICTIONS UPON BARGAINABLE ISSUES
Whether the process chosen for dispute settlement is arbitra-
tion or strike, restrictions on the number of bargainable issues
exist. For example, Section 56(2) of the Act states in part:
No collective agreement shall provide, directly or indi-
rectly, for the alteration or elimination of any existing term or
condition of employment or the establishment of any new
term or condition of employment....
(b) that has been or may be, as the case may be, established
pursuant to any Act specified in Schedule III.
Specified in Schedule III is the Public Service Employment
Act,38 which accompanied the Public Service Staff Relations Act
in its passage through Parliament in 1967 and which created the
Public Service Commission. The functions of the commission
3 8 The Public Service Employment Act, CAN. REv. STAT. Vol. VII C.P. 32
(1970).
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include supervising the merit system and staffing the public
service. It is through the commission that the employer may
cause employees to be laid off from work without regard to
seniority; 9 as well as making transfers, promotions, demotions,
releases, probations and appraisals without regard to the bargain-
ing agent.40 Superannuation is also excluded from the bargaining
table.41 Clearly, the above terms and conditions of employment
are traditionally regarded as negotiable issues in the private
sector. Therefore, whether the dispute settlement process chosen
is arbitration or strike, bargaining agents claim that serious
restrictions exist over the issues that are negotiable and which
must be altered. More is said on this subject below.
IV. BINNc ABrrRATiON
Bargaining agents claim that restrictions on traditional bar-
gainable issues are more severe for those who select binding
arbitration. Section 70 of the Act states the bounds within which
an arbitration tribunal must confine itself. It reads:
(1) Subject to this section, an arbitral award may deal with
rates of pay, hours of work, leave entitlements, standards of
discipline and other terms and conditions of employment di-
rectly related thereto.
(2) Subsection 56(2) applies, mutatis mutandis, in relation to
an arbitral award.
(3) No arbitral award shall deal with the standards, pro-
cedures or processes governing the appointment, appraisal,
promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or release of employees,
or with any term or condition of employment of employees
that was not a subject of negotiation between the parties dur-
ing the period before arbitration was requested in respect
thereof.
(4) An arbitral award shall deal only with terms and condi-
tions of employment of employees in the bargaining unit in
respect of which the request for arbitration was made.
Recently, the Public Service Alliance has stated that the arbi-
tration process is completely unacceptable in its present form.42
39 The Act § 29.401d. §§ 70(3), 86(3).
411d. § 56(2).42 Brief presented to the Advisory Committee, supra note 35, at 93.
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In its argument the Alliance focuses attention on the inability
of the arbitration tribunal to render decisions on any matter that
was not a subject of negotiation between the parties during the
period before arbitration was requested. As a result, the bar-
gaining agent may find itself in an extremely awkward position.
For example, the employees in the bargaining unit are asked by
the bargaining agent to indicate their choice of dispute settlement
through means of a vote. Before the vote is taken the bargaining
agent learns that a large proportion of the employees in the unit
have been designated so as to render any threat of a strike ineffec-
tive in gaining meaningful concessions. The opinion of the
bargaining agent is conveyed to the membership and arbitration
is chosen. Once having made such a choice, however, the bar-
gaining agent's attempt to resolve any issues which it considers
to be especially important may be completely thwarted if the
employer refuses to negotiate them. Indeed, the President of
the Alliance has recently stated that the employer has deliberately
refused to bargain over some issues because the employees in the
bargaining unit have selected arbitration. 43
Designations of employees is not the only reason employees
opt for binding arbitration. The unit may select arbitration be-
cause its size, composition and nature of the work performed
would not likely have a significant impact if the employees went
on strike. For instance, it may be doubtful whether employees
of the Dominion Coal Board or the National Library would fare
better if they chose the strike route instead of binding arbitration,
notwithstanding the greater restrictions imposed upon the latter
process. It is in bargaining units such as these where the arbitra-
tion process presents a viable alternative to strikes. Indeed, the
bargaining agents are not saying that arbitration should be
eliminated. Rather, they are calling for a broadening of the
authority of the tribunal. Therefore, merit exists for both proc-
esses. Nevertheless, a changing pattern in the desires of the
employees appears to be emerging. Evidence of this changing
pattern became evident in September 1970 when approximately
50,000 employees were requested to indicate their choice between
arbitration or conciliation with the right to strike. When the
43 The Labour Gazette, Canada Department of Labour, Vol. 71, No. 8, August
1971, at 538.
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results of the votes were compared to those in 1967 it was learned
that the number favoring arbitration had declined somewhat but
arbitration still remained the overwhelming choice.4
Unit favo
Communicators (614
employee unit)
Clerks
Administrative Foreign
Service
Financial Administrators
lo Employees % Employees
ring Arbitration favoring Arbitration
1967 Sept. '70
60% 47.0%
63% 59.3%
80% 77.6%
90% 79.4%
In 1971 the swing away from arbitration has been much
greater as the following table illustrates:45
ALTERATIONS IN DISPUTE PROCESS SPECIFICATION
Unit
Education
(list)
S & P Category
All employees ex
Defence Scientific
Research Officers
Heating, Power 8
Stationary Plant
Operation-S
(list + 0)
.t -NS
Firefighters-S
(list + O)
a -NS
Operational Catel
(list+ O)
GeneralLabor
&Trades-S
GeneralLabor
& Trades-NS
ONo. of employees 0No. of
inunit employees
proposedand/
or designated
2150 :(60)
D(A60)
9-
:ept
593 IP:(2029)
D(-)- +
2334.
9]P(12n)
D(-)- +
gory 629 2(8)-D(-)- +
185a P(2457)
D(-)- +
19856
Parties Ahleratiox Date
PSAC/TB AtoC 313171
PIPS/DB CtoA 2814171
PSAC/TB AtoC 22/7171
PSAC/TB
PSAC/TB
1?SAC/TB
PSAC/DEB
AtoC 22/71
AtoC 22/7/71
AtoC
Ato C
22/771
227/71
PSAC TB Ato C 26/8171
PSACOTB AtoC 261/8i
0 Number of employees reffects nmnber at time of certificatiom
o P = proposed; D = Designated; A = by agreement.
00" C to A = Conciliation (and strike to arbitration.)
A to C = Arbitration to conciliation (and strike). Employees of each uamt are
allowed to elect which method of settlement will be used.
+ Not determined to date.
44 The Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 16, 1970, at 29, col. 66.
45 Supplied by the Registrar of the P.S.S.R.B.
Change
-13.0%
- 3.7%
- 2.4%
-10.6%
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While arbitration continues to remain the most favored process
to resolve disputes the arguments advanced for change deserve
serious considerations. If restrictions continue on the authority
of the arbitration tribunal, the employees may eventually discard
that process entirely.
V. STYXEs AND LocKours
Employees in bargaining units who have opted for binding
arbitration are expressly prohibited by the Act from resorting
to strike46 to settle their disputes with the employer; as are the
employees in bargaining units who have opted for the strike
procedure but who are designated employees 47 For the remain-
ing employees in bargaining units who have opted for the strike
procedure there exists a real possibility that a strike will eventually
take place. There have been two legal strikes to date, both
involving the postal employees. The first of such strikes com-
menced on July 18, 1968 and continued for eighteen days until
August 8. The reaction of the public was mild during the begin-
ning stages of the strike. This was due to at least two major
factors. The first was attributable to an illegal strike of the postal
employees in July 1965 which had lasted seventeen days. Having
thus endured the experience of no mail services in 1965, businesses
and other institutions were better prepared for cessation of serv-
ices in 1968. Because of this past experience they had arranged
alternate methods of communication as threats of an impending
strike became more frequent at the negotiation table. The second
factor was due to a great deal of sympathy generated by the public
for the plight of the postal workers. This feeling was fostered by
the press who had been critical of the employer for withholding
concessions to demands that appeared to be reasonable.
As the strike continued, however, sympathy was replaced by
frustration and impatience. Pressure began to mount for the
government to take strong measures by legislating an end to the
strike. However, the government was extremely reluctant to
intervene during this first real test of the new collective bargaining
process. Fortunately the strike was settled with the assistance of
a mediator before the government was compelled to intervene.
46 The Act § 101(b).
47 The Act § 101(c).
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During the next round of negotiations involving the Council
of Postal Unions and the Treasury Board in 1970, the parties
were once again unable to resolve their differences. This time,
however, their strategy was changed. The employees had arrived
at a position when they could lawfully strike,48 but the Council
of Postal Unions made no declaration49 that a strike was to take
place. Instead, a series of rotating work stoppages commenced
on May 18, 1970. By prearrangement, bargaining unit employees
at one or several post offices in selected areas would fail to report
for work at the commencement of their regularly scheduled shift.
They would then remain absent from work for periods of either
twenty-four or forty-eight hours at which time they would report
for work and employees in other post offices would commence a
work stoppage in the same manner and so it continued. To remain
away from work for more than forty-eight hours without par-
ticipating in a declared strike or without other lawful excuse could
imperil their positions as employees.8 0 The strategy and direction
of the work stoppages was controlled by the union executives who
were negotiating with Treasury Board in Ottawa.
This pattern of work stoppages continued until an unexpected
turn of events occurred on July 8 when employees at the main
post office in Montreal and at four dependent post offices in the
Montreal area did not report for work at the commencement of
their regularly scheduled 6:00 a.m. shift. Many post offices are
dependent upon the Montreal post office for their supplies
because the sorting area for a significant portion of the Province
of Quebec is Montreal. By 8:00 a.m. employees in Quebec City
and thirty-nine post offices dependent upon the Quebec City post
office were informed that those post offices were immediately
suspending operations. Postal officials claimed Quebec City was
dependent upon the Montreal office and with the Montreal post
office closed there was no work available. This was in substance
a lockout by the post office. Thus, the post office had apparently
devised a scheme to counteract the union tactics and with the
disruption of postal services becoming much more widespread
hoped to focus public pressure on the postal unions to strive for
48The Act § 101(2).
49 The Act § 102.
GO S.C. 1966-67, 14-15-16 Elizabeth II, c. 77.
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a settlement. This same situation developed at a number of
other centers from time to time. The problem came before the
Board in a complaint 5' lodged by the Council of Postal Unions
alleging that the employer had caused a lockout which is not
expressly permitted by the Act. The Board dismissed the applica-
tion, ostensibly because the postal authorities were able to
satisfactorily demonstrate that the reason they undertook their
actions was to "maintain the optimum level of service possible in
the circumstances." The Board continued:
We are not concerned to judge whether the postal authorities
did or did not have reasonable grounds for believing that their
purpose would be achieved by the action they took, or that
the course adopted was one that would further the desired
objective in the highest degree or in a uniform fashion
throughout the postal service so long as we are satisfied that
it was their real purpose.
While the Board did not feel compelled to expressly state that
lockouts are prohibited per se, the President of the Treasury Board
appeared to have no doubts about the matter when he stated
publicly that the whole philosophy of prohibited lockouts in the
legislation ought to be reconsidered. 52
During the course of the 1970 strike a potentially acute prob-
lem became evident. The federal cabinet is composed of ministers
chosen from the political party having a majority of members
in the House of Commons. Each of these ministers usually heads
a government department. One such cabinet minister was the
Honorable C. M. Drury, Treasury Board President, whose depart-
ment was responsible, inter alia, for carrying out negotiations with
the Council of Postal Unions. It was essential that settlements
reached between the employer and employees who had opted
for the strike not be out of line with settlements obtained in the
arbitration process, if the two processes were to continue to exist
side by side in a balanced program. It was therefore necessary
for the Treasury Board to retain an overview of the entire public
service with a proper balancing of interests.
51 Council of Postal Unions v. Her Majesty in the Right of Canada as repre-
sented by the Treasury Board, Board file 161-2-85, August 27, 1970.
52 The Toronto Globe & Mail, supra note 44.
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On the other hand, another cabinet minister, the Honorable
E. Kierans, Postmaster General, had more immediate problems.
He warned that the loss of business in the postal service would
take a long time to recover its pre-strike position, and that perhaps
would never recover because of the efficient alternate modes of
communication that various business and other institutions were
turning to during the period of interrupted services and would
continue to retain when postal services were resumed. While Mr.
Kierans was voicing this concern and criticizing the postal workers
he could do nothing to rectify the situation because he was not
involved in the negotiations. Similar situations will undoubtedly
arise in the future. Whether or not the cabinet will retain an
outward appearance of unanimity remains to be seen. If such is
not possible, one wonders what effect a breakdown in the cabinet
will have upon the collective bargaining process.
From the experience gained in two legal strikes involving
postal workers several factors emerge. One, the public is prepared
to undergo a fairly high degree of inconvenience in order to allow
government employees to exert their lawful right to strike against
their employer. This tolerance of the public may be tempered
somewhat if the interruption of services occurs with regular
frequency. It would appear the postal workers recognized this
possibility during the second conflict when a method of rotating
strikes was implemented which avoided a complete cessation of
services. Another factor is the apparent limitation upon the
employer against locking out its employees. While the idea of
such a possibility may have been unthinkable prior to the strikes,
experience raises some doubts about the efficacy of such an
omission and there may indeed be situations where the right to
lock out employees is an important weapon in the employer's
arsenal. An additional factor is the potential divisiveness that
may explode within the government hierarchy which may seri-
ously impair the effectiveness of the present system. While there
must be one spokesman for the employer, there nevertheless exists
the need to consider all aspects of the immediate problem and
surely no one is more conversant with the problems than the
minister and his staff in charge of the particular department in-
volved.
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VI. LIMITATIONS UPON THE PowERS oF THE PuBLIC SERVICE BoARD
A. Implementation of Collective Agreements
When the parties reach a settlement in their negotiations
another limitation upon the collective bargaining process becomes
apparent. This limitation is on the powers of the Board. Section
56 of the Act reads in part:
(1) The provisions of a collective agreement shall, subject to
the appropriation by or under the authority of Parliament of
any moneys that may be required by the employer therefor,
be implemented by the parties,
(a) where a period within which the collective agreement is
to be implemented is specified in the collective agreement,
within that period; and (b) where no period for implementa-
tion is so specified
(i) within a period of ninety days from the date of its
execution, or
(ii) within such longer period as may, on application by
either party to the agreement, appear reasonable to
the Board.
On occasion the employer has failed to implement a collective
agreement within the required time limits. When a complaint5 3
was made over such delinquency the Board stated:
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, it is our
view that the Board is authorized to afford to a complainant,
if a proper case therefore is made out, relief against non-com-
pliance by the employer with the provisions of section 56(1)
(b) (ii) of the Act. That leaves the question-what type or
form of relief? There are two remedies that might be con-
sidered as being appropriate: (i) a declaratory decision; (ii)
a compliance order of some sort. We believe that the second
of these alternatives is not available here. There is little prac-
tical value in issuing a compliance order unless there is some
sanction that can be invoked if the order is disobeyed or
ignored.
53 The Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Her Majesty in the Right of
Canada as represented by the Treasury Board;-re Radio Operations Group, Board
ifies 161-2-50, 161-2-59, 161-2-60; December 1, 1969.
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Compliance orders are expressly provided for under section
20 of the Act for the types of complaints enumerated in that
section and the Act then goes on in section 21 to provide a
sanction for non-compliance with those orders in the form of
a report to the Minister through whom the Board reports to
Parliament and the Minister is required to lay the report
before Parliament within a fixed period of time. No such sanc-
tion is envisaged for any action the Board might think it
should take in regard to non-compliance with section 56. The
only sanction, if sanction it can be called, that might be in-
yoked in such an event would be for the Board to include a
statement concerning the non-compliance in its next annual
report to Parliament, a course that would prove of little
practical value to a successful complainant at a point of time
where the "sanction" might have any material significance for
him.
In light of what has been said above, we can do no more in
these matters than express the fervent hope that the Employer
will proceed to implement the collective agreement with the
utmost expedition.
Following this decision another complaint based on the same
section was filed with the Board."4 On this occasion damages in-
stead of implementation of the award was the remedy sought.
The complainant argued at length that boards of arbitration,
which decide rights disputes in the private sector, award damages
for breaches of collective agreements, and that their authority to
do so is implied rather than expressed. Furthermore, it was
argued that such implied authority has been upheld by the
Supreme Court of Canada. 5i However, the Board refused to grant
this remedy as well. It was of the opinion that it had no power
to assess damages for failure of the employer to comply with
Section 56. The Board would go no further than to say:
We therefore declare that the employer is in default in that
it has failed to comply with Section 56(1) (b) (i) of the Act
in respect of the argument relating to quite a number of
5 4 The Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Her Majesty in the Right of
Canada as represented by the Treasury Board;-re The Engineering and Scientific
Support Grou p, Board Mfe 161-2-24; January 21, 1970.
55 Re Palmer Corporation & Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union, Local 16-14 (1962), 33 D.L.R.(2d) 124.
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employees in the engineering and scientific support bargaining
unit. In the light of what we have said above, we can do no
more in this matter than express the hope that the employer
will proceed to implement with the utmost expediation the
collective agreement in those instances in which pay action
on behalf of employees in the bargaining unit here concerned
has not yet been completed at this date.
This inability on the part of the Board to order that proper cor-
rective measures be taken immediately is becoming a fairly
serious issue. During the fiscal year April 1st, 1969 to March 81st,
1970 there was a total of 65 complaints handled by the Board.
Forty-eight of the complaints alleged that the employer had
failed to implement the terms of a collective agreement within
the time limit fixed by Section 56 of the Act. 6
B. Alterations in Terms and Conditions of Work
Closely related to the problem of implementation of collective
agreements is one of altering the terms and conditions of work
after notice to bargain has been given. A total of nine57 of the
above sixty-five complaints alleged that the employer had altered
terms and conditions of employment after notice to bargain had
been given by the bargaining agent, contrary to Section 51 of the
Act.5"
56 Third Annual Report, supra note 12, at 28.
57 Id.
58 Section 51 reads:
Where notice to bargain collectively has been given, any term or
condition of employment applicable to the employees in the bargaining
unit in respect of which the notice was given that may be embodied in
a collective agreement and that was in force on the day the notice was
given, shall remain in force and shall be observed by the employer, the
bargaining agent for the bargaining unit and the employees in the bar-
gaining unit, except as otherwise provided by any agreement in that
behalf that may be entered into by the employer and the bargaining
agent, until such time as
(a) in the case of a bargaining unit for which the process for resolution
of a dispute is by the referral thereof to arbitration,
(i) a collective agreement has been entered into by the parties and
no request for arbitration in respect of that term or condition of
employment, or in respect of any term or condition of employment
proposed to be substituted therefor, has been made in the manner
and within the time prescribed therefor by this Act, or(ii) a request for arbitration in respect of that term or condition of
employment, or in respect of any term or condition of employment
proposed to be substituted therefor, has been made in accordance
with this Act and a collective agreement has been entered into or an
arbitral award has been rendered in respect thereof; and(b) in the case of a barganing unit for which the process for resolution
of a dispute is by the referral thereof to a conciliation board,(Continued on next page)
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In the Defence Research Board case59 the employees had en-
joyed subsidized transportation costing them $6.30 per month.
After notice to bargain had been given the employer gave notice
that the monthly contribution would be increased to $8.65. The
Board found that employer-employee contributions toward the
transportation costs were not fixed amounts, but a sum that would
fluctuate from time to time by a fixed formula, and dismissed the
complaint. Before doing so, however the Board indicated that its
powers to deal with alleged violations under Section 51 were
limited. After reviewing other Canadian labor statutes it con-
cluded:
they all prohibit the changing of working conditions in express
terms and either declare that such a change is an unfair prac-
tice or make it an offence to introduce a change. Section 51
of the . . .Act departs from this pattern in that it does not
make it an offence to alter terms and conditions of employ-
ment but rather treats any such alteration as a nullity.60
The employer argued that a remedy, if any, lies in the courts
and not in the Board. In reply to such argument the Board stated
that:
... the whole scheme of the Public Service Staff Relations
Act contemplates that the administration of the Act should
rest primarily in the hands of the several tribunals that were
established and that operate under the umbrella of the act
* . .Since the problem with which we are here concerned
cannot be brought either before the Arbitration Tribunal or
before an adjudicator, it was in the contemplation of the
authors of the legislation that it should be dealt with under
the Act by the... Board.61
The Board also stated 2 that the appropriate remedy for violating
Section 51 "would appear to be a declaration that the original
(Footnote continued from preceding page)W a collective agreement has been entered into by the parties,
n) a conciliation board has been established in accordance with
this Act and seven days have elapsed from the receipt by the Chair-
man of the report of the conciliation board, or
(iii) a request for the establishment of a conciliation board has
been made in accordance with this Act and the Chairman has noti-
fied the parties pursuant to section 78 of his intention not to establish
such a board.
59 Board file 161-2-10, April 29, 1969.
Go Id. at 6.
61 Id. at 7, 8.
62 Id. at 7.
1972]
KENTucKy LAw JoxuNAL
conditions continue to apply notwithstanding their purported
alteration by the employer". This decision was satisfactory to the
complainant under the circumstances surrounding the instant case.
By such a decision no harm could befall the employees for refusing
to pay the additional transportation costs. But, can the same be
said in situations where the employer acts unilaterally to the
detriment of the employees in which they have no control over
the situation? For example, imagine what would result if the
employer unilaterally decided to discontinue deducting union
dues and remitting them to the bargaining agent. If the Board
made a declaration that such alteration was a nullity it would be
a hollow victory indeed to the bargaining agent and employees
involved.
Therefore, whether the issue involves implementation of a
collective agreement or the alteration of an existing term or
condition of work, the bargaining agent will not be successful in
seeking redress through the Board. Of course, if the Board issued
a declaration and the employer chose to ignore it, the Board could
include the matter in its annual report to the Minister which
would then be placed before Parliament.0 3 But such a procedure
involves interminable delays and no one would seriously suggest
that such a route offers a satisfactory remedy.
VII. GRmVANcEs AND ADJUmCATIONS
Finally, there is the matter of processing and referring griev-
ances to adjudication.64 Features contained in this part of the Act
are unique in many respects but once again subject to considerable
criticism. It is important to note that any employee may pursue
a grievance through the grievance procedure and it is immaterial
if he is a member of a bargaining agent or in a certified bargaining
unit. Such a feature of the Act is most worthwhile. It provides an
available avenue for speedy resolution of employee problems.
Not all grievances are referable to adjudication however, and
herein lies the problem. In fact a great number of grievances fall
outside the jurisdiction of the adjudicators. These grievances are
decided instead at the senior administrative level within the de-
03 The Act § 115.
64 The Act §§ 90-99.
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partment; which is usually the deputy minister. Thus grievances
and adjudication are two distinct processes. While section 90 is
framed in very broad terms, it permits an aggrieved employee to
process almost any grievance, section 91 allows the grievance to
be referred to adjudication only in respect to "the interpretation
or application in respect of [the grievor] of a provision of a col-
lective agreement or arbitral award, or disciplinary action result-
ing in discharge, suspension or a financial penalty." An important
feature of the Act is that the grievance of an employee is the
property of the grievor. It is he and not the bargaining agent who
can process the grievance and, if adjudicable, refer the matter to
adjudication. There is, however, one caveat to the preceding
statement in that any reference to adjudication involving an
interpretation or application of a collective agreement or arbitral
award must have the approval of the bargaining agent.
Under certain circumstances the bargaining agent or employer
may refer a matter to the chief adjudicator under section 98.65
Such circumstance is limited to situations where the employer
and bargaining agent have executed a collective agreement or are
bound by an arbitral award and either party wishes to seek the
enforcement of an alleged obligation contained therein. Then, if
the alleged obligation is not one that could be the subject of
enforcement through a grievance brought by an employee either
party may refer the matter to the chief adjudicator. Whether the
grievance is to be processed under either section 91 or section
98 can be confusing. For example, when the employer trans-
formed a parking lot into one of reserved spaces only an employee
claimed the change to be a violation of the collective agreement.
65 Section 98 reads:
Sec. 98-Cl) Where the employer and a bargaining agent have
executed a collective agreement or are bound by an arbitral award and
(a) the employer or the bargaining agent seeks to enforce an obligation
that is alleged to arise out of the collective agreement or arbitral award,
and
(b) the obligation, if any, is not an obligation the enforcement of which
may be the subject of a grievance of an employee in the bargaining unit
to which the collective agreement or arbitral award applies,
either the employer or the bargaining agent may, in the prescribed man-
ner refer the matter to the chief adjudcator who shall personally bear
and determine whether there is an obligation as alleged and whether, if
there is, there has been a failure to observe or to carry out the obligation.
(2) The chief adjudicator shall hear and determine the matter so
referred to him as though it were a grievance, and subsection 95( 2) and
sections 96 and 97 apply to its hearing and determination.
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While grieving the issue66 with the approval of the bargaining
agent (thereby invoking section 91) the adjudicator nevertheless
dismissed the claim. He ruled that the grievance was a "group
grievance" and one which could not properly be referred to
adjudication under section 91. The adjudicator alluded to the
possibility of processing the grievance under section 98. He
stated:
Even if I agreed fully with the ... submissions of the grievor
I cannot see how they assist the grievor in showing that the
grievance concerns the interpretation of the Agreement in
respect of him, personally.
It would appear then, that grievances analogous to "group
grievances" in the private sector must be referred by the bargain-
ing agent to the chief adjudicator for determination under section
98.
However, in another decision17 involving an issue processed
under section 98 and determined by the chief adjudicator, a
grievance was dismissed when it became apparent that the bar-
gaining agent was pursuing a group grievance. The bargaining
agent alleged that the employer had failed to adjust allowances
upward in the Foreign Service. The chief adjudicator recognized
that it would be most inconvenient to compel employees serving
abroad to formulate their own grievances but said:
It was not impossible, factually or legally, for an individual
employee to present a grievance arising out of the Employer's
refusal to adjust [the allowances].
Section 98 contemplates what are commonly known in the
private sector as 'policy grievances', and thus provides for
their initiation by either an employer or a bargaining agent
seeking to enforce an obligation.
Before dismissing the grievance however he expressed the opinion
that the position adopted by the bargaining agent was the correct
one and that the employer was at fault in not implementing the
66 The Tulk case; Tulk and Treasury Board, Department of Fisheries and
Forestry, R. D. Abbott, Adjudicator; Adjudication file 166-2-404, March 18, 1971.67 The Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers and Treasury Board,
E. B. Jolliffe, Chief Adjudicator, Adjudication file 169-2-7, December 14, 1970.
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adjustments; but this opinion was not binding upon the employer.
The above decisions, issued within three months of each other,
immediately conjure visions of the era prior to the enactment of
the Judicature Acts when litigants were compelled to select their
courts with utmost care. The impact of the above decisions upon
bargaining agents and employees alike can only be frustration.
While it is recognized that a significant number of limitations
already exist on matters which may be referred to adjudication,
one can only question the efficacy of a system which compounds
such limitations through procedural hurdles. Indeed, the result
can only be a growing disenchantment with the system.
The second category of grievances involves "disciplinary
action resulting in discharge, suspension or a financial penalty". 8
A number of situations that at first glance may appear to come
within this category are really situations not involving disciplinary
actions or financial penalties at all and are thereby not adjudicable.
For example, terminations may not be disciplinary but may be
lay-offs due to lack of work;69 or rejections of probationary em-
ployees79 or terminations because of incompetence and inca-
pacity.7' In each of these situations the employment contract
between employer and employee is permitted to be severed and
cannot be a part of the adjudication process because they come
within the ambit of the Public Service Employment Act and not
the Public Service Staff Relations Act. Of course, a termination
may in fact be disciplinary under the guise of lack of work, etc.
and in such cases adjudicators look to the substance of the matter
and not mere form.72
A written reprimand not involving a financial penalty had
been held not to be "disciplinary action" within the meaning of
the section.7 ' The Alliance has stated that: "the most objection-
able question with regard to grievance/ adjudication machinery in
the P.S.S.R.A. is the limited scope of adjudication." 74 Of the 101
68The Act § 91(1)(b).60 The Act § 29.
70 Id. at 28.
71 Id. at 31.72 Caron and the National Capital Commission, H. W. Arthurs, Chief Ad-judicator; Adjudication file 166-2-1, August 9, 1967. The decision was upheld
upon appeal to the Board; Board fie 168-2-2, January 26, 1968.73 Turner and Treasury Board (Dept. of National Revenue), H. W. Arthurs,
Chief Adjudicator, Adjudication file 166-2-25, January 30, 1968.74 Brief presented to the Advisory Committee, supra note 85, at 111.
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decisions rendered by adjudicators relating to "discharge, suspen-
sion or financial penalty" during the initial two year period ending
March 81, 1969, 89 were dismissed because they were held to be
beyond the jurisdiction of adjudicators.7 5
From the foregoing discussion on grievances and adjudications
one would probably agree that grounds for reform exist in this
area. There is a growing number of complaints with this part of
the process. Whether or not the complaints are justifiable, the
bargaining agent has been given exclusive bargaining rights to
represent employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and it
seems logical that such rights should include grieving on its own
an alleged violation of the collective agreement to which it is one
of the co-authors and signatories. The need for extending such
rights to the bargaining agent in disciplinary matters resulting in
discharge, suspension or a financial penalty may not be as neces-
sary as in matters involving the interpretation of the agreement.
I suggest a similar need does exist especially when the employee
is reluctant to pursue the matter for personal reasons. The bar-
gaining agent should not have to rely upon a willing employee to
initiate and pursue redress. Rather, the bargaining agent should
be in a position to process the grievance itself if the employee is
reluctant to do so, but who does not otherwise object.
CONCLUSION
Collective bargaining was introduced to the public service
through the efforts of politicians in government who were familiar
with the characteristics of public servants and who were con-
vinced that collective bargaining would enhance the quality of
the service. The provisions contained in the legislation have
enabled a rational and orderly development of collective bar-
gaining to evolve to the extent that it has reached a level of
75 See, the First Annual Beport, supra note 18, at 42; The Second Annual
Report, supra note 86, at 44, and 46. While the Board deviated from the practice
it followed in compiling its information in the first two annual reports, it is
interesting to note the following comments at page 40 in its Third Annual Report,
supra note 12:
During the year under review, 45 references alleged disciplinary action
resulting in discharge, suspension or financial penalty, as compared with
46 in 1968-69 and 38 in 1967-68. Most of such cases resulted from
suspension. Therefore while the number of cases is remaining fairly con-
stant, the basis for the vast majority of grievances in 1969-70 is due to
alleged improper suspensions.
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sophistication hardly thought possible only four short years ago.
The process has been tested in the extreme on two occasions and
has survived. The shortcomings in the process discussed in this
article are not exhaustive but probably represent the criticisms
causing the most concern on a continuing basis. Concern has not
been restricted to the immediate participants. The government,
as an independent body, has also played its part by establishing a
committee to review the legislation which is expected to recom-
mend various reforms. Hopefully, such a review at this time will
lead to the correction of the major deficiencies in the Public
Service Staff Relations Act.
